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UNIVERSAL EMPIRES:
PATHOS AND ENGINEERING
DAVID W I L K I N S O N

Universal empire is one of two political equilibrium phases of
world systems/civilizations. By comparison to states systems, universal empires are peaceable, repressive, stagnant—and shortlived. Why are they fragile? How do they break up? How might
they become more stable?
Reprise. This is the seventh in a series of papers exploring the
relationship of civilizations theory to world politics. T h e First
paper in the series (Wilkinson, 1982) defined "a civilization" using
criteria of level-and-connectedness rather than the more customary criteria of level-and-uniformity. Screening a list of some seventy candidates yielded a list of fourteen entities which appeared
to be societies at a civilized level (criteria: cities, record-keeping,
economic surplus, non-producing classes etc.) which were also
connected world systems—militarily closed, geotechnologically isolated social-transactional networks with an autonomous political
history d u r i n g which they did not take or need not have taken
much account of the possibility of conquest, invasion, attack—or
alliance and c o o p e r a t i o n — f r o m any outsiders, although the
members of each such system did recurrently conquer, invade,
attack, ally with, command, rule, legislate, cooperate with, and
conflict significantly and effectively only with one another.
Table 1 gives the resulting roster of civilizations/world systems.
Figure 1 is a chronogram showing the lifespans and relative
(Mercator) locations of the civilizations in the roster.
T h e most striking effect of the new definition on accustomed
lists of civilizations was that such a c c u s t o m e d e n t i t i e s as
Classical/Hellenic/Greco-Roman Civilization, Hittite Civilization,
Arabian/Magian/Syriac/Iranic/Islamic Civilization(s), O r t h o d o x
Christian Civilization, Russian Civilization, and even o u r own
familiar Western Civilization, were reclassified either as episodes of
or as regions within a previously unrecognized social-network
entity, by my definition both a civilized society and a world system,
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hence a single civilization. This civilization I have labeled Central
Civilization (Wilkinson, 1987).
Central Civilization was created in the Middle East d u r i n g the
2nd millennium B.C. by an atypical encounter between two preexisting civilizations. Civilizations may coexist, collide, break
apart or fuse; when they have fused, they have typically done so
by an asymmetric, inegalitarian e n g u l f m e n t of one by the other.
But the linking of the previously s e p a r a t e Egyptian a n d
Mesopotamian Civilizations through Syria was an atypical, relatively symmetric and egalitarian "coupling" which created a new
joint network-entity rather than annexing one network as a part
of the other entrained to its process time. T h e new Central network, in an unbroken existence and process since then, has been
atypical in another way: it has expanded, slowly by the reckoning
of national and state turnover times, but quite rapidly by comparison to other civilizations, and in that expansion has engulfed
all the other civilizational networks with which it once coexisted
and later collided. Now e x p a n d e d to global scale, Central Civilizations constitutes the single contemporary instance of the species
"civilization" (Wilkinson, 1982, 1987).
TABLE 1
A Roster of Fourteen Civilizations
(In approximate o r d e r of incorporation into Central Civilization)
Civilization

Duration

Terminus

1. Mesopotamian before 300 BC — c. 1500 BC
2. Egyptian
3. Aegean
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Indie
Irish
Mexican
Peruvian
Chibchan
Indonesian
West African
Mississippian
Far Eastern
Japanese
Central

Coupled with Egyptian
to f o r m Central
before 3100 BC — c. 1500 BC Coupled with Mesopotamian
to f o r m Central
Engulfed by Central
c. 2700 BC — c. 560 BC
Engulfed by Central
c. 2300 BC — c. AD 1000
Engulfed by Central
c. AD 450 — c. 1050
Engulfed by Central
b e f o r e 1100 BC — c. AD 1520
Engulfed by Central
before c. 200 BC — c. AD 1530
Engulfed by Central
? — c. AD 1530
Engulfed by Central
before AD 700 — c. 1550
Engulfed by Central
c. AD 350 — c. 1590
Destroyed (Pestilence?)
c. AD 700 — c . 1700
Engulfed by Central
b e f o r e 1500 BC — c. AD 1850
Engulfed by Centra]
c. AD 650 — c. AD 1850
•>
c. 1500 BC — Present
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FIGURE 1
T H E INCORPORATION OF
TWELVE CIVILIZATIONS I N T O ONE
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Civilizations considered in their political aspect (and as world
systems, in their world-political aspect) ordinarily have one or the
other of two political structures: th estates system (= state system =
multi-state system = system of many i n d e p e n d e n t states) and the
universal empire (= universal state = world state = one-state system). Figure 2 is the chronogram f r o m Figure 1, complicated by
symbolization of the states-system periods, epochs of universal
empire, and currently unclassifiable eras, of each civilization.
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FIGURE 2
A L T E R N A T I O N S BETWEEN S T A T E S SYSTEMS
AND UNIVERSAL EMPIRES

EACH VERTICAL BAR IN THIS CHRONOGRAM REPRESENTS A CIVILIZATION: SEE FIGURE 1
THE AREAS MARKED | | | ARE UNIVERSAL EMPIRES.
THE AREAS MARKED $f|| ARE STATES-SYSTEMS.
THE AREAS MARKED ??? AND g g g ARE DOUBTFUL.
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TABLE 2
T h e Universal Empires of the Fourteen Civilizations
Civilization

Empire

Span

Duration

c. 2350 — c. 2230 BC
c. 2050 — c . 1960 BC

120
90

1. Mesopotamian

a. Akkadian
b. T h i r d Dynasty
of Ur
c. Babylonian

c. 1728 — c. 1686 BC

42

2. Egyptian

a. Old Kingdom
b. Middle Kingdom
c. New Kingdom

c. 2850 — c . 2180 BC
c. 1991 — c. 1786 BC
c. 1570 — c . 1525 BC

670
205
45

3. Aegean

a. Minoan

c. 1570 — c. 1425 BC

145

4. Indie

a. Maurya

c. 262 — c. 231 BC

31

5. Irish

None?

6. Mexican

a. Aztec

c. AD 1496 — 1519

23

7. Peruvian

a. Inca

c. 1 4 7 0 — 1533

63

8. Chibchan
9. Indonesian

10. West African

11. Mississippian

None?

b. Madjapahit

c. AD 695 — late
13th century
AD 1293 — 1389

a. Ghana
b. Mali
c. Songhai

c. AD 950
c. AD 1330
c. AD 1500

a. Srivijaya

600
96
?
?
?

None?

12. Far Eastern

a. Ch'in-Han
221 BC — AD 184
AD 589 — 750
b. Sui-Tang
c. Mogul-Ming-Manchu AD 1 2 7 9 — 1850

405
161
571

13. J a p a n e s e

a. T a i h o
AD 702 — 1336
b. Hideyoshi-Tokugawa AD 1590 — 1868

634
278

a. Neo-Assyrian
b. Persian-Macedonian
c. Roman

11
209
255

14. Central
Near Eastern Phase
Graco-Roman Phase

663 — 652 BC
525 — 316
20 BC — AD 235

About twenty-three universal empires and about twenty-eight
states systems may be identified. T h e universal empires of the
fourteen civilizations are listed in Table 2. Universal empires
seem on the whole to be shorter-lived than states systems (Wilkinson, 1983).
An examination of the kinematics of world systems showed
that, of six kinematic theories examined, Toynbee's revised
theory (1961: 197-209, 304) best fits the data. Universal empires
recur in civilizations' histories, but are more prominent in later
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epochs; once established, they are unstable, and ordinarily destroyed, replaced by states systems; once destroyed, they can be
re-established by the reunion of the states system, and they usually are (Wilkinson, 1986).
T h e conditions favoring a n d favored by states systems (Wilkinson, 1985) imply the analogous conditions for universal empires.
A compact territory whose size and terrain permit fast transit with
extant technology of movement, having a closed frontier and
relatively sedentary population, should be easier to bring and
keep u n d e r imperial rule than one lacking some or all these
features. Cultural homogeneity, expensive sophisticated
weaponry, and dominant offensive military systems all favor
unity (Wright, 1965, 797n96, 1529; Quester, 1977, 208; Quigley,
1983, 38-40, 50-53,56-59; Wilkinson, 1985). Universal states tend
to homogenize their populations, to enforce peace, to repress
f r e e d o m , and to stifle innovation (Wesson, 1967, 26, 36, 46;
Wilkinson, 1985).
Pathos. Universal empires have on the whole been shorter-lived
than states systems (Wilkinson, 1983). Furthermore, the average
m e m b e r of the set of universal empires seems to deviate farther
f r o m the ideal type than the average m e m b e r of the set of states
systems deviates f r o m its ideal: control f r o m the center is never
quite fully established. This suggests the desirability of studying
the pathos, the characteristic morbidity, of universal empire, by
inspecting the mortalities of such empires. What are the conditions leading to the overthrow and downfall of universal empires
and their replacement by systems of independent states? Let us
approach this question by distinguishing the "fall" that concerns
us f r o m others, and by searching for pattern in those falls.
Falb, falls andfalls. We are here concerned only with the fall of a
universal empire, by which is meant the lasting loss of that empire's universality, the displacement of a fundamentally unitary
polity by a condition in which two or more significant independent centers of power compete at such a distance as to establish
their own spheres of influence, territorialities, and/or capitals,
with frontiers, buffers, disorder and/or condominium between.
T h e fall of a universal empire is consequently not identical to,
and does not always n o r necessarily entail, the fall of the empire
(the loss of all or nearly all its non-metropolitan territories), the
fall of the state (the loss of the metropole's independence), the fall
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of the nation (an end to the history of the ruling people as a
self-conscious prime collectivity), nor the dynasty, the civilization,
the constitution, the capital city, the regime, the elite, the ruler.
All may in fact accompany the fall of the universal empire, as may
have h a p p e n e d to the Incas; other falls may follow the first at a
respectable distance, as with Rome* but with no particular implication that the first fall renders the rest inevitable, only perhaps
more probable.
As we shall be concerned with describing the falls of universal
empires, other associated falls are mentioned only incidentally, as
they coincide with these and partly share the same causality.
Those falls that occurred when intruders f r o m an external civilization conquered the universal state (Aztec and Inca empires) or
forced it to take a role in their states system (Manchu and T o kugawa empires) or in a new enlarged states system (New Kingdom Egypt) we shall set aside, on the g r o u n d that these events
may have no interesting endogenous explanation: to remain universal, the empire would have had to subjugate the entire intruding civilization, or to fend off the intruders u n d e r circumstances
that prevented coalescence of the civilizations (Japanese, Central
and Indonesian civilizations all fended off Mongol, and West
African civilization Moroccan, intrusions, though the intrusion
into J a p a n stressed the Taiho UE and that into West Africa
disrupted the Songhai UE).
Seventeen cases remain in which a universal empire collapsed
f o r reasons other than e n g u l f m e n t o f its civilization by another: in
Mesopotamian civilization, Akkad, Ur, Babylon; in Egypt, the
Old and Middle Kingdoms; in Aegean civilization, the Minoan
empire; in Indie civilization, the Maurya empire; in Indonesian
civilization, Srivijaya and Madjapahit;. in West African civilization, Ghana, Mali, Songhai; in Far Eastern civilization, the T'ang;
in Japanese civilization, the Taiho; in Central civilization, the
Neo-Assyrian, Macedonian and Roman empires. What have the
falls of these universal empires in common?
Themes of ruin. Collapses of universal empires, and consequent
re-emergences of states systems, display a variety of motifs. Satraps usurp; provinces rebel; barbarians invade; border states
arise; sects partition; classes struggle; enemies combine; troubles
multiply. These themes recur with different frequencies, but
none seems universal.
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Satraps usurp: the centrally appointed civil or military governors of provinces acquire their own forces, wealth, lineages and
clienteles, and in d u e course ignore or resist the edicts of the
capital (Ur, Babylon, Old Kingdom Egypt, Madjapahit, Songhai,
Han, T'ang, Taiho, Assyria, Macedon, Rome). Provinces rebel:
imperial territories, once independent, r e m e m b e r that past and
rise u p to reclaim it (Akkad, Ur, Babylon, Middle Kingdom
Egypt, Mali, T'ang, Assyria, Macedon, Rome). Barbarians invade: uncontrolled, unsettled peoples near or at the frontier, who
may once have traded their goods or sold their labor to the UE,
now infiltrate, raid, loot, and at last conquer and rule pieces of it
(Akkad, Ur, Babylon, Middle Kingdom Egypt, Ghana, Mali,
T'ang, Assyria, Rome).
Border states arise: former barbarians set u p imitative but
independent "reaction states" beyond the UE's sphere of control,
extending the limits of the civilization even as they restore to it a
multistate structure of authority (Babylon, Maurya, Srivijaya,
Madjapahit, Ghana, T'ang, Assyria, Rome). Sects partition: religious groups establish new and insubordinate structures of authority, territorially bounded, within the body of the empire;
these become the bases for new, divisive or secessionist or border
states (Maurya, M a d j a p a h i t , G h a n a , Songhai, H a n , T a i h o ,
Rome). Classes struggle: the metropole is divided, and its ability
to hold down the provinces reduced, when the metropolitan
population rebels against the costs of empire (Ur);or the imperial
bureaucracy evolves f r o m a tool of imperial control into an
office-owning, self-serving elite (Old Kingdom Egypt); or armies
develop collective identities, consciousness and ambitions that
r e n d e r them mutinous and unserviceable f r o m the point of view
of the state (Rome).
Enemies combine: rebelling provinces, usurping warlords, invading barbarians, nascent borderers, disputatious sects and classes join hands to down their common enemy, the metropolitan
state of the universal empire (Ur, Babylon, Songhai, Taiho, Assyria, Macedon).
Troubles multiply: rebellion encourages rebellion, secession
secession; failure to win quick decisive victory against one enemy
inspires others to attack; preoccupation with attacks at one frontier of the empire drains others of the forces that once deterred
such attacks; crises become simultaneous, and "ally" implicitly
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with each other (Akkad, Ur, Babylon, Old Kingdom Egypt, Middle Kingdom Egypt, Crete, Mauryas, Madjapahit, Mali, Songhai,
Han, T'ang, Taiho, Assyria, Macedon, Rome).
O n e theme does however appear so often that we may reasonably hypothesize that it is in fact universal. It seems that the
maintenance of a universal empire continually requires an extraordinary level of political performance f r o m a monarchic
leader, and that such a level of performance cannot be sustained
over an indefinite period: the monarchy eventually fails to perform.
The fundamental theme of monarchic failure. Most political structures have some real, functioning monarchic office or
component—King, E m p e r o r , President, Prime Minister,
Maximum Leader, General Secretary—whatever their nominal
constitution. T h e monarchic element is however remarkably
prominent or exaggerated d u r i n g the foundation of universal
empires, and d u r i n g their successful maintenance as well: at such
times their histories are inseparable, and nearly indistinguishable, f r o m monarchic biographies. And monarchic crisis is very
characteristic of the fall of universal empire. T h e succession may
be so fast that no leader is ever secure enough in control of the
metro pole to have a long e n o u g h tenure to solve the problems of
the provinces (Akkad, Mauryas, Mali, Songhai, Assyria, Rome),
or so slow that the leader outlives his ability to rule (Old Kingdom
Egypt). It may be so irregular that several dynastic lineages establish themselves in d i f f e r e n t territories and partition the empire
(Middle Kingdom Egypt, Mauryas, Madjapahit, Taiho, Assyria,
Macedon, Rome) or exhaust its ability to control its provinces in
their struggles to control the metropole (Mali, Songhai, Han,
T'ang, Assyria, Rome), or again so regular that properly selected
incompetents occupy the imperial office and prevent it f r o m
functioning (Han, T'ang, Taiho, Macedon). T h e universal empire may indeed be so personal a work of art that it does not long
survive its f o u n d e r (Babylon, Maurya, Madjapahit, Macedon).
Whatever the details, the failure of a universal empire to e n d u r e
is so often associated with, and attributed to, a failure of its
monarchy to keep its performance u p to an exceedingly high
standard to allow us to speculate that the personality, p e r f o r m ance and institution of the monarch is the weak link of the UE.
Such a speculation might either be treated as a hypothesis, and
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tested, or as a conclusion, and applied. T o treat it as a hypothesis
would direct us to examine those cases of UE collapse where a
monarchic failure is not obtrusively evident (Ur, Crete, Srivijaya,
Ghana) and search for evidence of one or another characteristic
type of such failure. T o treat it as a conclusion might lead us f r o m
historical to practical speculation.
Engineering. As the contemporary global civilization is neither
in n o r predictably approaching a universal empire, reflections on
UE political engineering are indeed speculations. They need not
be entirely u n g r o u n d e d , however. Some UEs have lasted for
many generations; some universal e m p e r o r s a n d imperial
philosophers, especially those f r o m Far Eastern, Japanese and
Central civilizations, have left more or less detailed traces of how
they treated universal empires as problems of practical, as well as
speculative, political design.
Given the sources of past troubles, a universal empire designed
for durability would surely spend its political design energies
consciously monitoring the permeability of and movements
across its frontiers, the division of power between its provinces
and metropole, the condition of class and sect and national consciousness t h r o u g h o u t its territories and institutions, as well as
such more readily measured indicators as population growth,
food production and storage, distribution of wealth, etc. T h e
Roman, Han, T ' a n g and Taiho empires seem to have had better
constitutional, bureaucratic and/or traditional means of carrying
out these tasks than others. T h e i r experience and activity might
serve as starting points for designers of stable UEs.
But the most challenging UE design problem is necessarily the
monarchy. T h e default, "normal," "natural" resolution of the
monarchy issue in a UE seems to be arbitrary power + life tenure
+ succession either t h r o u g h male lineage or by coup and assassination. But arbitrary power sooner or later induces bizarre, perverse, impolite and impolitic behavior on the part of the Imperator. Life tenure promises incompetent finales, often quite
p r o t r a c t e d , a n d provokes assassination. Lineage succession
rapidly produces minors as monarchs, regencies, crown-prince
syndrome, incompetent successors, failure of issue (with remote
and disputed succession), and manipulative intrigues (to control
the person of the monarch) a m o n g regents, attendants, spouses,
lovers, harems, relatives who cannot succeed, relatives who can,
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in-laws, ministers, etc. Hereditary life tyranny seems unlikely to
be a monarchic form that will stabilize a UE; and dictatorship
tempered by assassination cannot take a very long view.
Where the ruling lineage becomes a merely reigning lineage,
the monarchy issue simply devolves upon the regents, chief
ministers, guardians, etc., since their succession must similarly be
arranged. T h e Taiho regime perhaps managed this best, but not
by any clear structure or principle. Some m o d e r n states with
relatively long, orderly and successful executive successions may
o f f e r better exemplars. Most frequently such states have hereditary reigning lineages, elected parliaments, overt and pluralistic
party systems, and powerful but short-term prime ministers. Republics with no hereditary lineage, with the monarchic component of the state in the hands of powerful elected fixed-term
presidents, or of powerful and (sometimes) recallable leaders of
single ruling parties supervising removable shorter-service prime
ministers, are less tested and probably less satisfactory institutional resolutions of the monarchy issue. If a f u t u r e UE were to
outlast the Taiho, it would probably have a political structure of
"republican monarchy," with or without a hereditary-lineage
component.
UEs are characteristically f o r m e d by one regional state in a
states system conquering the rest, and display the peculiarities not
just of their civilization but of their f o u n d i n g state. China, India,
the Soviet Union and the United States are contemporary states
which already encompass territories and populations comparable
to those of the largest UEs of the past. T h e monarchic element of
their respective constitutions (meaning here the actual constitution, in the Aristotelian sense, and not a formal document) has
produced reasonably orderly successions for periods ranging
f r o m less than a generation (China) to more than two centuries
(U.S.) It is unlikely that any historian would aver that the succession process in any of the four countries has produced uniformly
excellent "monarchs"; on the other hand, over the duration of
their orderly successions, large and heterogeneous territories and
populations have been held together despite secessionist tendencies and movements. Of the four, only Russia and America currently possess both the capabilities needed, and the universalistic
ideologies inclined, to operate foreign policies of global scope,
whereby they extend their influence t h r o u g h o u t Central Civiliza-
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tion. T h e current states system is not unconditionally stable and
viable; most of its predecessors have in d u e course been united by
one of their members, usually by a great power whose systemwide
operations have been in evidence for several generations. It is
p r o p e r to ask whether either superpower would, as metropole, be
able to run a durable global UE, and how such empires, assuming
them to be durable, might be expected to differ.
T h e Soviet state is younger, less well established, but has survived more violent civil war and external attack; though its
monarchic succession system is less institutionalized, and its economy less successful in producing surplus for political use, the
Soviet state is neither unstable nor impoverished by comparison
to most states in the current system. Both America and Russia
have faced the issue of "republican monarchy": both have rejected and avoided hereditary lineages, at the cost of making most
successions unpredictable; the U.S. has thus far been more successful in finding workable substitutes for life tenure and arbitrary monarchic power, without in the process having also been
able to assure consistently excellent performance. Both major
current candidates for f o u n d e r state do seem to have the institutional resources f r o m which a relatively durable UE could be
forged.
Assuming that either state were to establish a rather durable
universal empire, of say a century's span: have we any basis for
predicting the pecularities of either? No; but the UEs of the past,
the internal structure of each state, and the structures of their
respective c u r r e n t alliances, hegemonies, spheres of influence,
etc., provide at least a basis for speculation. National, religious
and class differences and consciousness should be assumed to
persist; there will be a "metropole" and "provinces," and an
orderly fluctuating flow of protest and rebellion.
A durable American or Soviet UE could be speculatively constructed in several ways. T h e least imaginative of these is to
visualize the m i n i m u m change f r o m their current internal and
imperial structures needed to give them global extent. As today,
then, we might expect that twenty or thirty large local insurgencies against local elites would exist at any given moment. Local
military forces would, as now, keep order, with continuing metropole subsidy and occasional large-scale participation by metropolitan troops (an American UE would have larger subsidies, a
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Soviet more direct participation). Metropolitan control over provincial elites would be maintained by a combination of direct
appointment, command, subsidy, mediation a m o n g provincialelite factions, and providing r e f u g e or assistance to political opponents of ruling provincial elites: a Soviet UE would be more
command-oriented and concerned with control over the provincial nomenklatura, an American more subsidy-oriented, with sanctions by reduction of access to metropolitan markets. Both UEs
would assert legitimacy based on universal ideologies: an American UE would have a liberal ideology, probably emphasizing the
economic components of that ideology (laissez-faire and liberality), at the expense of its political component (liberty); a Soviet UE
would be socialist in ideology, probably emphasizing the ultimate
universality of socialist experience rather than the "many roads"
of national socialisms. Both UEs would also assert legitimacy
based on increased provincial consumption and wealth, with faster accumulation expected, and more fluctuation tolerated, in an
American UE; the elites which would take the lion's share of that
increased wealth would be associated more with property-owning
in an American, with office-holding in a Soviet UE. Both UEs
would also d e p e n d for acceptance on a cultural, and especially a
technological, "seduction" of the provinces by the metropole; an
American UE would more likely attract provincials by opportunities to immigrate and grow rich, a Soviet by opportunities to
secure an education and gain status in the provincial elite.
Which state might produce the more lasting UE, with its
characteristic features (vices or virtues) of peace, order and stagnation? A Soviet UE might be expected to be better at the UE's
basic task of surviving, effectively (if inefficiently) deterring and
suppressing rebellion a n d secession by maintaining, threatening,
and where necessary applying overwhelming conventional military and police force. A Soviet UE would look more like the
historic norm; an American would doubtless deviate towards
greater disorder—more creativity, more violence, and a shorter
lifespan.
T h e r e is plenty to doubt in these imaginings; still they are the
sorts of imaginings to which the student of civilizations can bring a
particular perspective. If it is true that collapses of universal
empires, and consequent re-emergences of states systems, are
strongly associated with performance crises in the monarchic
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sector of the state, with rebellions of regional warlords, satraps
and governors, with uprisings of unassimilated subject peoples,
and with sectarian and class consciousness, these problems, and
responses to them, must surely be features of any discussion of
the f u t u r e of universal empire. (The challenging consolidation of
border states beyond some geostrategic boundary, or repeated
blows f r o m converging barbarians, belong in such discussions
only if and when one expects to see such border states and
barbarians again).
And if these things are so, then surely a universal empire
designed for durability would be well advised to close its ecumene
(or advance its military frontiers whenever a settled population
arose outside them); thoroughly homogenize old and continuously reintegrate new ethnicities, sects and classes; divide power
federally between provincial and metropolitan bureaucrats;
maintain civilian control over the military; and, above all, seek to
resolve the continuing crisis of the imperial leadership.
University of California, Los Angeles
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APPENDIX
Endogenously Fallen Universal Empires
la. Akkad. T h e fall of the Akkadian UE impends in the reign of
Naram-Sin, king of the Four Regions of the world, king of the universe,
and God as well. T h e God Naram-Sin had constantly to fight to keep the
universe, and fought all r o u n d his frontier: Lebanon, Ebla, Hurrians of
the T a u r u s , Lullubi of Luristan, "Magan" in the south. Naram-Sin was
able to claim victory in these encounters, and to pass the throne within his
lineage. T h e fall occurs in o r just after the reign of Sharkalisharri, "king
of kings," Naram-Sin's successor. His struggle was as constant, but he was
slowly driven back toward the metropole. In the northwest, Sharkalisharri had to fight a wave of Semitic Amorite nomad tribesmen f r o m
the Syrian desert. T h e Gutian hill people of the Zagros u n d e r Sharlak
raided trade and upset irrigation. T h e Lullu also raided widely; Anubanini their king set u p a victory stele. In the east, Inshushinak, vassal
governor of Elam, rebelled, claiming Elamite supremacy over the "four
regions" and the universe, and raided Mesopotamia to the fringes of the
capital. An independent dynasty was established in the subject Sumerian
city-state of Erech/Uruk. Sharkalisharri was "forced to turn desperately
f r o m one flank to the other, holding off with failing blows the pressure
which was at length to crush his kingdom" (Gadd 1971b, 454). T h e
Sargonid succession, perhaps fraternally arranged for Binkalisharri, was
broken. Sharkalisharri vanished, to be succeeded by chaos at the center:
f o u r kings reigned or claimed to reign in three years. T h e Guti in d u e
course succeeded to Akkadian primacy, but not to the universal empire.
(Gadd 1971b, 454-456; Roux 150-153; Lloyd 138-139; Saggs 52-53).
lb. Ur. In the reign of Ibbi-Sin, subject city-states and provinces fell
away, first slowly, then faster. Eshnunna withdrew recognition of IbbiSin's overlordship in his second year, Susa in his third, with apparent
impunity. In the fifth year, Amorite tribes f r o m the west, raiders of
village and caravan, turned the flank of the defensive wall system, began
taking fortresses, and cut communications with the still-loyal subject
areas. T h e capital could not be supplied with grain. Fiftyfolding of grain
prices was followed by rebellions. T h e king was unable to avoid delegating authority in Isin and N i p p u r to a regional governor, Ishbi-Erra.
Larsa fell to Nablanum the Amorite. In the eleventh year Ishbi-Erra
declared himself independent and proceeded to expand his domain at
Ibbi-Sin's expense. Elam, Amorites and Subartans invaded, and fought
or negotiated with the king, as U r declined apace. Many Sumerian cities
were occupied o r destroyed. Elam, Subartu and perhaps others at last
breached the walls of Ur, slaughtered the people, sacked, b u r n e d and
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garrisoned the city and carried Ibbi-Sin away to Iran a captive. (Gadd
1971a, 609-617; Roux 165-169; Lloyd 157; Saggs 57-59).
lc. Babylon. H a m m u r a b i the unifier died; Shamshuiluna succeeded, to
continuous trouble. Raiding Kassites f r o m the northeast mountains established a kingdom on the middle Tigris, cutting communications with
Assyria, which Adasi led into independence. Elamites supported the
Rimsin revolt in Uruk, Isin and Larsa, which, failing, gave way to the
Ilumailu revolt in the south, the founding of the Sealand kingdom in
Sumer, and a long war that inflicted attrition on Babylon. Eshnunna
revolted in the northeast, was subdued, rose again, and was again put
down. Amorites attacked f r o m the northwest, then Elam f r o m the east.
Babylon's empire was reduced to the country of Akkad; even there revolt
occurred. (Gadd 1973, 220-223; Roux 223-225; Lloyd 160; Saggs 74;
MacQueen 96-98; King 197-203).
2a. Old Kingdom Egypt. Because of irregular royal successions followed
by usurpers' distributing state wealth to placate officials; or because of
the exhaustion of royal resources in self-aggrandizing constructions and
self-serving mortuary endowments; o r because imperial of ficials became
a semi-hereditary class, for whose sons more and more n u m e r o u s but less
and less lucrative positions were created, impoverishing taxpayers and
bureaucrats alike and thus paralyzing the administration; or because
Phiops II reigned long past his ability to rule: central control over the
nomes deteriorated, the titles of the nomarchs rose, strong personalities
made their offices hereditary, and the nomarchs at last asserted their
independence of the central power. (Kanawati 70-79; Starr 63; Smith
195).
2b. Middle Kingdom Egypt. At the b r e a k u p of the X l l t h dynasty Egypt
was divided between the X l l l t h and XlVth (Xois) dynasties. Various
Asiatic peoples whose sheikhs were "Princes of the Desert uplands"
infiltrated the Delta. Foreign lands rebelled. By the reign of Sobkhotpe
IV Avaris was in Hyksos hands. (Starr 66; Hayes 44-54).
3a. Crete. T h e Minoan thalassocracy remains hypothetical a n d disputed, but is generally j u d g e d to have controlled Cyclades, Anatolian
mainland posts, perhaps Athens, Megara and "Minoa" in Sicily by naval,
religious, and/or colonial means. Its end is similarly problematic: earthquakes, vulcanism, infiltration, arson, invasion, revolt, depopulation, the
rise of Mycenaean power, are variously cited and disputed. (Hagg and
Marinatos; Hagg, Marinatos et al.; Mellersh 1967, 127-134; Mellersh
1970, 119-125, 141; Alexiou 50-58; Hood 52-60; Willetts 128-142; Matz
1973a, 164; Matz 1973b, 557-558, 577-581).
4a. Mauryas. Asoka's administration was centralized and personalized
rather than bureaucratic. Despite Asoka's propagation of Buddhism, no
single national culture or consciousness existed. Long-lived legitimate
monarchs of high ability and u n i f o r m doctrine would have been needed
to stabilize the realm. T h e r e was no orderly succession to Asoka. Short
weak reigns and early deaths were the rule for the later Mauryas. T h r e e
religions—Jainism, Saivism, Buddhism—competed for state favor. T h e
most pacific, non-violent, and therefore state-paralyzing, Jainism, dis-
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placed Buddhism in royal favor in the metropole. Male relatives of Asoka
set themselves u p as independent kings, with the imperial dominions
being divided first perhaps on East/West and also Jain/Saivite lines, and
later fragmenting f u r t h e r . A dangerous b o r d e r state was established in
Bactria by Euthydemus. (Alahakoon; T h a p a r 182-212; T h o m a s 511-513;
Rapson 514-518; Sastri 242-248).
9a. Srivijaya. T r a d i n g principalities rose beyond the imperial frontier
in northeast Java and Malaya, intercepting and diverting spice trade and
revenues. T h e realm may have broken into 8 kingdoms by 1292.
(Zainu'ddin, 41-46; Robertson and Spruyt, 49-57, 65-68).
9b. Madjapahit. T h e state was the personal construction of a few remarkable men, notably Gadja Mada. Split lineages divided the domain.
Local penetration by Islam reduced the legitimacy of non-Islamic rulers.
Malacca, Thailand, and Islamic trading principalities on the north coast
of Java rose, shifting main trade routes and diminishing central revenues
and relative wealth. Communications were inadequate to prevent the
outer extremes drifting into independence. (Zainu'ddin 49-52; Vlekke
48-69; Tas 10; Robertson and Spruyt 75-115).
10a. Ghana. T h e strength of northern neighbors rose; they conquered,
plundered, subjugated and partly converted Ghana. Local neighbors
also gained strength, and the empire slipped away. (Levtzion 376-377).
10b. Mali. T h e r e were no defined rules of succession. Monarchic
succession quarrels a m o n g sons and brothers produced plots, coups,
nine successions in 60 years (5 "irregular"), and familial civil wars. Weak
kings could not d e f e n d the non-Malinke (non-metropolitan) territories
where authority and legitimacy d e p e n d e d on the ability to provide security. T h e Mossi attacked T i m b u k t u ; it was not d e f e n d e d ; T u a r e g took it
over. O t h e r subject areas broke away. (Levtzion 381-385;- Ly-Tall 172174).
10c. Songliai. T h e r e was no genuine system of royal succession. T h e
established practices actually excluded and provoked to rebellion the
ablest and most trusted lineage members, who as regional governors
were far f r o m the capital whose intrigues produced the proclaimed
successor. Partisan factionalism divided Muslim f r o m traditionalSonghai groups and areas, and provided recruits for rebellious claimants. Two-thirds of the askiyas were deposed. T h e repeated succession
crises and struggles—6 successions in 45 years, then 3 in 9 years—
preoccupied the lineage. Periods of stability were squandered as the
askiyas consumed the privileges of power, while making no attempt to
invest in strengthening the state or the army. O n e succession crisis led to
a civil war which destroyed half the army, and whose losers welcomed the
opportunistic foreign attack of encroaching borderers f r o m Central
Civilization on the winners. (Cissoko, 1975, 227-228; Cissoko, 1984, 187196; Levtzion 439-446).
12a. Han. A minor e m p e r o r was the center of a power struggle between
the palace eunuchs, in-law clans, and gentry-officials. T h e monarch was
weak, incapable, isolated; the power-seekers were ambitious and unscrupulous. A variety of small rebellions broke out; the largest, led by a
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charismatic faith healer, aimed at a change of dynasty. T o deal with all at
once, provincial governors were appointed to mobilize all forces in their
provinces and crush rebellion. These governors in their turn became
independent centers of power. T h e next succession produced massacre
and chaos at the center, a n d then a division of the empire a m o n g the
warlords. (Ssu-ma, xxvi-xxviii, 2-38).
12b. T'ang. During the Hsiian-tsung reign (712-756) an arguably universal empire arguably ceased to be so. On the northeast frontier the
states of Parhae (Po-hai) and Silla were nominally tributary, actually
independent, but untroublesome. T h e mobile nomadic Khitan and Hsi
provided persistent pressure against the frontier, usually at war and
always needing to be pacified. In the northwest the Uighurs were
nomadic, relatively peaceful, friendly and untroublesome despite tribal
coalitions that occasionally looked like empires. T h e semi-civilized Tibetan frontier was locked though violent. But in response to the continuing
barabarian frontier pressure, the empire had created massive border
standing armies u n d e r autonomous military governors. T o maintain
imperial unity required their careful selection and central control; but
the T ' a n g central army h a d been allowed to decay, and after the death of
the chief minister Li Lin-fu there was no strong responsible leader. T h e
monarch was inactive; the new chief minister was a factional rival of the
most powerful military governor. 751 saw many military reversals: by
Arabs at Talas in the northwest, by Khitan and Hsi in the northeast, by
the allied state of Nan-chao, foolishly provoked to rebellion, in the
southwest, where unready and u n h a p p y T ' a n g conscript armies, incompetently generaled by factionalists, dissolved, to the ruin of metropolitan
prestige. T h e northeastern general, An Lu-shan, provoked by central
weakness and plotting, and hoping to establish a new dynasty, revolted.
T o d e f e a t him r e q u i r e d great devolution of authority to regional
warlord-governors, some themselves rebels, and hence the loss of effective control within much of the imperial frontier; and the withdrawal of
garrisons facing Uighurs and Tibetans, and the consequent radical contraction of that same imperial frontier. (Backus; Twitchett, 438-463;
Peterson, 464-487).
13a. Taiho (named a f t e r the Japanese legal code of 702). In this longlived, homogeneous a n d remarkably stable universal empire, succession
problems arose repeatedly and were solved irregularly, with each irregularity tending to evolve into a constitution. Prerogatives of the Yamato
clan imperial lineage had been usurped by the in-law Fujiwara clan via
regency and civil dictatorship; Fujiwara incompetence was dealt with by
the Minamoto warrior clan's military dictatorship; the Hojo clan u s u r p e d
the Minamoto role a n d then ruled through Fujiwara and Yamato figurehead military dictators. Yamato p u p p e t emperors occasionally regained real power by abdication, as retired e m p e r o r s and priestly retired
emperors, but were weakened by a rivalry between j u n i o r and senior
subclans. In d u e course the Hojo regents grew lax in their attention to the
loyalty of their vassal clans and the respect of the rest. Emperor Daigo II
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mobilized disaffected monasteries, nobles and warriors; Hojo vassal
clans revolted; the Ashikaga clan took leadership and destroyed the
Hojo. Daigo sought to rule; the Ashikaga revolted again, and set u p the
rival Yamato line as p u p p e t emperors. So far unity. But Daigo then set u p
a rival "Southern" imperial court at Yoshino which maintained itself,
through wars and frontier shifts, for 56 years of Ashikaga-Yamato split
hegemony. From 1392 to 1467 there was only partial reunification, with
the Yamato u n d e r Ashikaga shogun control, but with Ashikaga primacy
a m o n g rather than hegemony over the provincial military governors, the
shugo, and an unstable balance between hegemony and independence.
After the Onin war of 1467-1477, the regional lords, daimyo, were autonomous regional hegemons for the next century. (Hall, 1970, 102-107;
Kawai 65-66; Hall and Toyoda 11-13; Hall, 1977, 39-43).
14a. Assyria. Shamash-shumukin, ruling in Babylon, led Chaldean
north and central Babylonia in rebellion against his brother Ashurbanipal, with support f r o m Elam, some Arabs, and Nabu-bel-shumat of the
Sealand. T h e revolt was put down and Babylon and Susa taken, but
lasted seven years. Lydia u n d e r Gyges and Egypt u n d e r Psammetichus I
broke away about this time. T h e growing hill state of the Medes at
Ecbatana threw off its treaty of submission. Ashur-elil-ilani fought down
his brother Sinsharishkun to gain the throne, put down another revolt,
reigned about f o u r years, and was replaced by his brother. T h e Phoenician cities fell away. J u d e a intervened in Samaria with impunity. Babylon
rose again u n d e r Nabopolassar, who slowly conquered the fortified cities
of Sumer and Akkad. T h e Elamites regained their f r e e d o m . Cyaxares'
Medes, neutralizing Assyria's Scythian allies, invaded Assyria, captured
Assur, massacring, plundering, slaving, deporting. Babylon a n d Media
allied, conquered Assyria, captured, plundered and destroyed Nineveh.
(Laess<|>e 123; Saggs 134-139; Starr 137-138; Roux 343-347; Brinkman
93-111).
14b. Macedon. Alexander astonished the world for the last time in 323
B.C., dying with no legitimate son (but a pregnant non-Macedonian
wife), and no competent heir (but a retarded half-brother). T h e r e was no
definite capital, though Babylon had been considered: Macedon, the
metropole, was on the empire's far frontier; the army was the de facto
capital. T h e r e was no definite constitution: the officers a n d cavalry
declared for the fetus, the infantry for the idiot; a compromise established the nominal rights of both. Meanwhile the Greeks of Bactria,
Athens and Aetolia rose u p to seek independence. T h e r e was no single
ablest logical de facto successor, but three equally implausible ones: the
aged isolationist Antipater was in E u r o p e as de facto metropolitan regent, the ambitious upstart de facto second-in-command Perdiccas was
with the army in Asia, the trusted nominal proxy Craterus was homeward bound with returning veterans. Perdiccas tried to overset the other
"triumvirs" and was assassinated; Craterus was killed in the fighting;
Antipater soon died. T h e provinces had been parceled out to ambitious
and able satrap-governors like Ptolemy, Antigonus Monopthalmos,
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Eumenes, Lysimachus, later Seleucus. Once the center h a d vanished,
coalition wars ensued, in which the "rival generals balked each other of
securing over-all mastery." (Starr 403; Will 23-39).
14c. Rome. Here the "fall" of the UE well predates the falls of empire,
state, and city, though coinciding with falls of ruler, quasi-dynasty, and
quasi-constitution. T h e key point for the UE appears to be the displacement of "Parthia" by Sassanid Persia. T h e r e is however a key question of
interpretation. If Parthia was a significant, independent, viable and
civilized power f r o m the time of Augustus to that of Ardashir, basically a
unitary state; if the Augustan peace was one of equals; if the captures of
Ctesiphon by T r a j a n , Verus a n d Septimius Severus were ephemeral and
meaningless: then there was no Roman universal empire. If, on the
contrary, Phraates' return of the Roman prisoners a n d lost eagles of
Carrhae was a concession extorted by a massive threat of force; if Parthia
was thereafter at its strongest a relatively insignificant frontier state which
could do no more than d e f e n d itself, and was unaggressive because
grossly unequal to Rome; if "Parthia" was more usually a disunited
collection of weak local feudalities; if the Parthians were not full members of Central Civilization but semi-barbarian overlords whose city
provinces need not be d e f e n d e d because they were not essential to their
power; if the Romans could take but not hold precisely because at a
civilization's frontier it can never quite force its peripheral peoples to
come to grips with it; if the Roman expeditions were in fact punitive
frontier excursions that controlled those beyond as much as necessary
and possible by wearing down and disrupting: then there was, as I believe
there was, a Roman universal empire.
T h e third-century troubles of the Roman state included weak young
"emperors" managed by others, conspiracies, assassinations, usurpations, mutinous legions, a r m e d forces inadequate to handle simultaneous troubles on German and Persian frontiers. T h e overtaxation was
more wastefully overspent than usual. From 235 to 285 there was a
high-speed turnover of emperors, mostly m u r d e r e d , with about 2'A year
tenures (five departures in the one year 238—Maximinus T h r a x , Gordians I a n d II, Pupienus and Balbinus). Ardashir's Persian state took full
advantage of the German frontier problems, the m u r d e r of Alexander
Severus, and the subsequent chaos to establish a stable Persian empire,
clearly "civilized" in its ability to mobilize, conquer, shift its frontier,
found cities and deport populations. T h e n c e f o r t h the Roman state,
intermittently united, was no longer plausibly "universal." (Ensslin
68-81; Yarshater 1-lii; Bivar 66-67, 80-81, 91-97; Frye 116-127).
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